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#dns

31 posts28 participants5 posts today

"Die CUII gibt auf." Huh. Krass! Da sieht man mal, wie sehr sich etwas Mut und Courage lohnen können - und auch dass Einzelne etwas bewirken können! ✊

Kontext: 2024 veröffentlichte eine damals 17–Jährige die eigentlich "geheimen" Sperrentscheide von Websites der privat organisierten und nicht demokratisch legitimierten "Clearingstelle Urheberrecht" (CUII),
ein Zusammenschluss von Urheber.innen und Providern. Nun soll es wieder Gerichtsentscheide für Sperren brauchen.
netzpolitik.org/2025/die-cuii-

netzpolitik.org · Die CUII gibt auf: Für Netzsperren braucht es jetzt einen GerichtsentscheidDie CUII, ein Zusammenschluss von Internetprovidern und Rechteinhabern, verzichtet nach einem Rüffel der Bundesnetzagentur darauf, nach eigenem Gutdünken Websites zu sperren. Das haben wir vermutlich der 18-jährigen Lina zu verdanken.

Since DNS is on 🔥 today I should note if you're a Splunk shop, the DNS data model in Enterprise Security does not include the field for TXT record values, you need to add that manually.

Then you can do high-fidelity detections such as length and base64 with conversions looking for code.

DNS TXT isn't just for malware, C2s and exfil. It can be fun too!

  • ASCII art (Resolve-DnsName -Type TXT run-dns.never.watch).Strings | Sort
  • Storing encodings 🐱.never.watch
  • Mazes! (Resolve-DnsName -Type TXT maze.never.watch).Strings | Sort
  • QR codes (Resolve-DnsName -Type TXT qr.never.watch).Strings -replace '#','█' | Sort
  • Trolling/activism ··⧸··⧸.never.watch
  • Guitar tabs
  • Playlists/reading lists
  • Geocities-era guest books

Unbound 1.23.1 in now available. This security release fixes the Rebirthday Attack CVE-2025-5994.

The vulnerability re-opens up #DNS resolvers to a birthday paradox, for EDNS client subnet servers that respond with non-ECS answers. The #CVE is described here:
nlnetlabs.nl/downloads/unbound

We would like to thank Xiang Li (AOSP Lab, Nankai University) for discovering and responsibly disclosing the vulnerability.
github.com/NLnetLabs/unbound/r

Just a quickie from one of our @DomainTools researchers today that I know @cR0w will enjoy.

Malware in DNS - specifically, malware seen being assembled from DNS TXT records.

Not a "zomg new thing!" so much as a neat example in the wild.

#infosec #cybersecurity #DNS

dti.domaintools.com/malware-in

DomainTools Investigations | DTI · Malware in DNS - DomainTools Investigations | DTIBecause it's always DNS, we wanted to share this fun finding of malware stored across DNS TXT records.

#BGP #routage Hier, Cloudflare a cessé d'annoncer son préfixe 1.1.1.0/24 (pour une raison inconnue). Les nombreuses annonces « pirates » de ce préfixe ont alors été davantage visibles, amenant certains, apparemment à tort, à croire qu'elles étaient la cause de la panne du résolveur #DNS 1.1.1.1.

mastodon.gougere.fr/@bgp/11485

Car, oui, il y a encore des réseaux (Tata, par exemple) qui annoncent ce préfixe, qui ne leur appartient pourtant pas.

Mastodon - Gougère NetworkBGP WhichASN (@bgp@mastodon.gougere.fr)@bortzmeyer 1.1.1.0/24 13335 Details: On prefix: https://stat.ripe.net/ui2013/1.1.1.0/24 On AS: https://stat.ripe.net/ui2013/AS13335

DNS Esoterica - Why you can't dig Switzerland

shkspr.mobi/blog/2022/07/dns-e

As part of my new job, I'm learning a lot more about the mysteries of the Domain Name System than any mortal should know I thought possible.

The humble unix dig command allows you to query all sort of DNS information. For example, to see name server records for the BBC website, you can run:

dig bbc.co.uk NS

Which will get you:

;; Got answer:;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 35614;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 8, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 17;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 1232; COOKIE: 097db2ee4c92b84982083ecf62b5b5f2007906e616035113 (good);; QUESTION SECTION:;bbc.co.uk.         IN  NS;; ANSWER SECTION:bbc.co.uk.      900 IN  NS  ddns1.bbc.com.bbc.co.uk.      900 IN  NS  dns0.bbc.co.uk.bbc.co.uk.      900 IN  NS  ddns1.bbc.co.uk....

And a whole lot more. But you can go further down the DNS tree. What are the nameservers for .co.uk?

dig co.uk NS

And you'll get your answer. You can go one further and see the nameservers for the Top Level Domain:

dig uk NS

Which replies with:

;; Got answer:;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 54061;; flags: qr rd ra ad; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 8, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 17;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 1232; COOKIE: 880427eda8ff71de2ab4f43862b5b65f95e317d29cc10a8e (good);; QUESTION SECTION:;uk.                IN  NS;; ANSWER SECTION:uk.         159692  IN  NS  nsc.nic.uk.uk.         159692  IN  NS  dns1.nic.uk.uk.         159692  IN  NS  nsd.nic.uk....

And that works with every TLD. Countries like de, generic names like museum, and internationalised domains like 在线. All of them work!

Except Switzerland.

Switzerland's country code is ch - after the name Confoederatio Helvetica. Let's run the dig on it: dig ch NS

;; Got answer:;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: REFUSED, id: 31910;; flags: qr rd; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1;; WARNING: recursion requested but not available

We have been refused and warned. But why does this only happen with Switzerland?

The blame - as with most modern ills - lies in the mid-1970s. The Bee Gees were storming the charts with "Jive Talkin'", the Rocky Horror Picture Show was gathering a cult following, and MIT scientists were causing chaos. Literally.

Chaosnet was an early network protocol designed for local networks. It was technically very clever but, sadly, never really took off.

However, it found its way into DNS records. Let's go back to the answer to dig bbc.co.uk NS:

;; ANSWER SECTION:bbc.co.uk.      900 IN  NS  ddns1.bbc.com.

OK, the first part is the domain name. The number is the TTL. The IN is the class. The NS says this is a nameserver record. And, finally, we get the domain of the nameserver.

But, in the class, what does IN stand for?

"Internet", obviously. Wait... Isn't the DNS on the Internet? Why do we need to specify that these DNS records are for Internet?

Well, isn't it obvious? Because you might want records of a different network. Like, for example, Chaosnet.

And if Internet is abbreviated to IN, what is Chaosnet shortened to? That's right! CH.

So, dig sees you enter ch for Switzerland, but thinks you're asking about CH for Chaosnet. And so it fails.

In order to query the records for ch we need to provide an absolutely fully-qualified domain name. It's as simple as sticking a dot at the end of the domain name:

dig ch. NS

;; Got answer:;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 64932;; flags: qr rd ra ad; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 5, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 11;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 1232; COOKIE: e19b9c23cdfa0f7bcf82750462b5c16b47744386c7974ffb (good);; QUESTION SECTION:;ch.                IN  NS;; ANSWER SECTION:ch.         164894  IN  NS  e.nic.ch.ch.         164894  IN  NS  a.nic.ch.ch.         164894  IN  NS  f.nic.ch.

And there we go. A failed 1970s experiment like bell-bottoms and Betamax videos - but with much longer lasting consequences.

You can see some CH records by running like:

dig ch txt @f.root-servers.net version.bind

That will get you something like:

;; ANSWER SECTION:version.bind.       86400   CH  TXT "cloudflare-f-root-20190930"

Of course, DNS doesn't only have IN and CH class records.

There's also Hesiod - HS. But you already knew that, right...?

Terence Eden’s Blog · DNS Esoterica - Why you can't dig Switzerland
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