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#responsibledisclosure

1 post1 participant0 posts today

Found critical vulns in Lovense (the biggest sex toy company) affecting 11M+ users. They ignored researchers for 2+ years, then fixed in 2 days after public exposure. 🤦

What I found:
- Email disclosure via XMPP (username→email)
- Auth bypass (email→account takeover, no password)

History of ignoring researchers:
- 2022: Someone else reports XMPP email leak, ignored
- Sept 2023: Krissy reports account takeover + different email leak via HTTP API, paid only $350
- 2024: Another person reports XMPP email leak AND Account Takeover vuln, offered 2 free sex toys (accepted for the meme)
- March 2025: I report account takeover + XMPP email leak, paid $3000 (after pushing for critical)
- Told me fix for email vuln needs 14 months because "legacy support" > user security (had 1-month fix ready)
- July 28: I go public
- July 30: Both fixed in 48 hours

Same bugs, different treatment. They lied to journalists saying it was fixed in June, tried to get me banned from HackerOne after giving permission to disclose.

News covered it but my blog has the full technical details:
bobdahacker.com/blog/lovense-s

bobdahacker.com · Lovense: The Company That Lies to Security ResearchersHow Lovense has ignored the same critical vulnerabilities for 2+ years, lied about fixes, and manipulated bounty payouts while leaving 10s of millions of users exposed.

I received an email earlier this week from EA asking if I wanted to be added to a public acknowledgement page they were creating for individuals who responsibly disclosed vulnerabilities to them.

For all the shit people give EA, of the 100+ companies I contacted in the last two years, they were the only company I would say had a decent incident response.

They fixed the issue within 12 hours after validating it as critical, and proactively provided me multiple updates over time.

When the IR was done on their side, they reached out again with some more information about the potential impact if the issue hadn't been solved quickly, and also offered me a reward.

I did not have to keep chasing anyone for updates, I wasn't asked for non-disclosure, or offered money in exchange for it, and people replied instead of ignoring me.

I wasn't blamed for their mistake, either, or reported to the authorities.

Unfortunately, at least one or multiple of the things mentioned above are present in most of my other incidents reported; it's a real shit show out there.

In August 2020, @SchizoDuckie and I published what was to become the first of a series of articles or posts called "No Need to Hack When It's Leaking."

In today's installment, I bring you "No Need to Hack When It's Leaking: Brandt Kettwick Defense Edition." It chronicles efforts by @JayeLTee, @masek, and I to alert a Minnesota law firm to lock down their exposed files, some of which were quite sensitive.

Read the post and see how even the state's Bureau of Criminal Apprehension had trouble getting this law firm to respond appropriately.

databreaches.net/2025/07/04/no

Great thanks to the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension for their help on this one, and to @TonyYarusso and @bkoehn for their efforts.

Looking for some help, boosts appreciated:

Anyone with a security contact at Disney or ABC Network?

I know Disney has a bug bounty program, but the issue is with a third-party software leaking data from multiple companies.

Found no information as to who owns the software online and would like some help figuring out who to notify.

Replied to JayeLTee

@JayeLTee Just to add some context about my attempt to get Mango's Place to lock down their data back in 2022:

I had been contacted by a researcher with info on the exposed data. Because that researcher was not in the U.S., I followed up on unsuccessful notifications with a phone call. I even made a note of who I spoke to in August 2022.

But alerting entities to their leaks is not my job, and when they didn't get back to me, I eventually forgot about them. I had waited to report anything because -- unlike a site that all-too-often reports on leaks that are still exposed --- I didn't want to publish about a leak where the still-exposed data had their name in the storage location's URL.

Whether Mango's Place will get sued by any irate parents remains to be seen. If they are, their failure to respond in 2022 may become part of any case.

Replied to JayeLTee

@JayeLTee This is why sometimes it's not enough to just disclose responsibly to an entity. Did you let the data protection regulator know that although the entity is claiming 4-day exposure window, your research found it was almost a year? And did you tell the data protect regulator that the entity is reportedly telling some departments that their data was not exposed, when you found clear proof that it was?

@lfdi

It's particularly frustrating when the big tech firms don't respond appropriately to alerts.

@JayeLTee tells me he reported a server with 2.1B infostealer records hosted on Microsoft servers to cert.microsoft[.]com -- which is the URL listed in the WHOIS to report illegal content. His case came back within an hour as closed but they didn't do anything! He's trying abuse@microsoft[.]com now.

Anyone at #Microsoft reading this: c'mon folks, respond appropriately to notifications like this.

"Italy, exposed database puts dental clinic patients’ data at risk: "
suspectfile.com/italy-exposed-

@amvinfe followed up on some findings by @chum1ng0 and they tried to get two entities to lock down exposed data that includes personal information.

Despite repeated notifications, the data are still not locked down, it seems.

A company appears to be abusing #BugCrowd’s #bugbounty program to hide essential details of a critical vulnerability. The company itself has rated the vulnerability as low severity. This has led many to disregard the vulnerability, which may have resulted in unpatched systems that remain vulnerable.

"I would like to remind you that as a researcher using the BugCrowd platform to submit this issue you are bound by the BugCrowd standard disclosure terms and you may not blog or disclose any information on the exploitation of this vulnerability."

I were to follow these rules, it would mean that countless of client systems could remain vulnerable to this critical vulnerability.

I’ve mostly had good experiences with bug bounty programs before this incident. Sure, I’ve had some disagreements at times, but I’ve never seen a program being abused like this before.

CFTC Awards Over $8 Million to Insider Whistleblower Who Aided CFTC and Other Agency Actions - Commodity Futures Trading Commission

Whistleblowers are eligible to receive between 10 and 30 percent of the monetary sanctions collected. All whistleblower awards are paid from the ...

cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleas

www.cftc.govCFTC Awards Over $8 Million to Insider Whistleblower Who Aided CFTC and Other Agency Actions | CFTC

Boeing CEO Dave Calhoun knew about whistleblower retaliation - Quartz

Dave Calhoun told U.S. senators this week that the company always listens to whistleblowers, but that he hadn't personally done so.

qz.com/boeing-ceo-dave-calhoun

Quartz · Boeing's CEO says he knew about retaliation against whistleblowers — but never talked to themBy Erin Marquis / Jalopnik