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Pyre – Where Obscurity Sways Review

By Dear Hollow

Swedeath is one of those games I have zero skin in, but its close overlap with hardcore-influenced death metal and death ‘n roll makes that relationship complicated. Like I could not be bothered by Left Hand Path, but Wolverine Blues is a stalwart among my music collection; Bloodbath is regrettably not an act I return to regularly,1 but I consider Black Breath one of those rare successful intersections of grind, death metal, and death ‘n roll. My point is, I don’t know where the line is drawn between these styles but I know I like some of it and then can’t be fussed about the rest of it. With Pyre, the jury’s still out.

Where Obscurity Sways is the Saint Petersburg quartet Pyre’s third full-length, and it wavers between full-on Entombed worship and something resembling Fuming Mouth. Professing a frigidity more closely resembling black metal coursing throughout, Pyre offers chunky riffs, feral vocals, tense tremolo and chuggy shreds, and a bouncy sense of ubiquitous buzzsaw and passages of doomier tempos, alongside a wailing lead guitar whose rip-roaring solos are owed to multiple members’ contributions to the traditional heavy metal sister act Blazing Rust. Pyre throws the kitchen sink at us, blurring the lines between hardcore- and Swedeath-influenced death metal, boasting that black metal chill and no-holds-barred attitude – only for Where Obscurity Sways to go in one ear and out the other.

That’s not to say you won’t swing your fists and break your neck across Where Obscurity Sways. Big groovy meatheaded fun is front and center with Pyre, a monosyllabic approach that’s as effective as its moniker, despite its various experimentalisms. In the sweet spot that finds itself between chunky riffs, wailing leads, and punishing weight at the mercy of the shifting tempos (“Murderous Transcendence,” “Writhing Souls”), the album pumps adrenaline, utilizing sticky chugging riffs as both capitalization of crescendo and simmering burn. When black metal rears its despondent head (“Murderous Transcendence,” “Prognostic of the Apocalypse”), the sound is transported to a cold second-wave atmosphere that it aims for. Composition is precise and effective, as a smart use of shifting tempos and proper utility of punk beats lead to satisfying conclusions of both intensity and doom (“Where Obscurity Sways,” “Pestilential Fumes”). Barked and howled vocals, provided by bassist Dym Nox, land squarely in crusty territory throughout, although the isolated occurrence of death metal gutturals (“From the Stygian Depths”) is a welcome change of pace for Pyre.

Pyre’s monotonal vocals and inconsistent uses of tempos keeps it from achieving its true potential. The Russians run quite similarly into the same issues as Arizona’s deathgrind/death-doom band Thorn, in which the atmosphere and weight is communicated well enough, but nothing more breaks through the surface. Where Obscurity Sways is entirely inconsistent, Pyre’s tracks blur together in monotonous doom sprawls, but then utilize different tricks for each half of the album: the first half weaponizes wailing leads and ominous melodies, while the second dwells entirely in darkened tremolo. Each has its highlights (“Where Obscurity Sways,” “Pestilential Fumes”) and their droning sloggers (“Domains of the Nameless Rites,” “Chanting Ancient Incantations”). While the two instrumental pieces are decent enough to establish a semblance of atmosphere, their motifs are not utilized across the rest of the tracks for it to stick. In true crusty fashion, Pyre saturates its sound into a crusty, HM-2, Swedeath goo, so it’s easy to let the album at large settle into the background.

Apart from “Murderous Transcendence” and “Writhing Souls,” the whole of Where Obscurity Sways hangs out in relatively decent yet ultimately forgettable territory. Somehow Pyre makes the album seem too long even at a very reasonable thirty-six minutes, but when several songs blur together into a featureless expanse, it’s difficult to track. Some tracks are smartly composed, others painfully dull. Despite its attempt to blend Swedeath, hardcore, doom, and black metal, it keeps tripping itself up with inconsistent tempos and motifs. Utilizing more death vocals, sticky chugs, and black metal, Pyre will have a winning formula. As it stands, Where Obscurity Sways stays obscure.

Rating: 2.0/5.0
DR: 7 | Format Reviewed: 320 kb/s mp3
Label: Osmose Productions
Websites: pyredeathmetal.bandcamp.com | facebook.com/pyredeathmetal
Releases Worldwide: January 31st, 2025

#20 #2025 #BlackBreath #BlackMetal #BlazingRust #Bloodbath #DeathMetal #DeathDoomMetal #Entombed #FumingMouth #Hardcore #Jan25 #OsmoseProductions #Pyre #Review #Reviews #RussianMetal #Thorn #WhereObscuritySways

Replied in thread

@kissane

(5/5) Getting back to the IFTAS issue, I'll point to the specifics of about.iftas.org/activities/mod again, because I often see "Come on!" replies that gloss over them:

  • Their solution is summarized as "standardised processes and resources for monitoring distributed media", with hash databases curated by external entities

  • "We cannot open the underlying hash matching databases, and any implementers will need to separately pursue access to these resources.": this is a clear constraint that server instances will hash media locally, and send hashes to "somewhere", for classification; this also implies that the classifying entity can build hash catalogs of all media present on the instances that request classification from it

  • "If we find pertinent matches we’ll provide human review, notify you via email and issue a takedown request. We perform any required reporting and law enforcement record-keeping so you don’t have to." - Based on which jurisdiction?

  • "CSAM" and "terrorism", two of the Four Horsemen of the Infocalypse, are used as a promotion tool for the hash-and-match approach; red flags all over here - "terrorism" as defined by Turkey, for the Kurds? By the PRC, for the Uyghurs? By Putin, for occupied territories? Again: who is curating the hash databases? Who is curating the curators? This is particularly troubling since automated reporting is already part of the system, and using NCMEC in a first step normalizes the reporting to authorities per se, by starting with a specific implementation that does not raise too many objections.

  • "Once these hash databases are in place, we will explore text classification for issues like spam, child sexual exploitation, hate and harassment." - World-wide valid classification, based on what criteria?

It's important to realize that IFTAS being small and most likely not being a malicious actor is irrelevant. It does not take a decidedly malicious business organization like #Thorn (that colluded with EU commissioner #YlvaJohansson – there is ample material about hash-and-match as part of the EU's attempt at #ChatControl). All it takes is a useful door opener organization. I do not share your optimism that "currently ascendant systems are not inevitably annihilating forces, but legal and financial constructs that can be brought to heel, forcibly reconfigured, or just replaced" – especially in the age of grey intelligence, grey policing, and public-private partnerships.

IFTAS · Content Classification Service
More from IFTAS Blog

#ChatControl is a really bad idea, but it also remains a file tainted from its very beginning with shady lobbying connections between #Europol, #Thorn and the EC.
While the European Ombudsperson's investigation is still ongoing, another report by #BalkanInsight reinforces concerns regarding undue influence:

„Europol representatives said that an “administrative error” had resulted in his employment by Thorn being approved unconditionally.”

balkaninsight.com/2024/10/11/e
#ChatControl #StopScanningMe

Continued thread

Why would #Europol want to 'forget' proper attention to internal rules regarding conflicts of interest around #Thorn and #ChatControl?

„Europol stands to gain significantly from the regulation put forward by outgoing European Commission for Home Affairs, Ylva Johansson.“

„Europol had requested unfiltered access to the data that would be harvested under the regulation’s plan to scan online content for CSAM. The agency also asked that the AI technology behind it be applied to other crimes too.”

@bert_hubert (in [0]), de titel in de vergaderagenda van het Kabinet klopt sowieso niet:

    Kabinetsstandpunt inzake de
    EU-Verordening ter bestrijding van
    online seksueel kindermisbruik

Chatcontrol gaat namelijk geen:

    online seksueel kindermisbruik

bestrijden. Ik leg het, voor allen die (nog) niet weten wat het doel van Chatcontrol nou eigenlijk is, nog eens uit. Dat is om:

    Informatie, die een burger vanaf een
    smartphone probeert te verzenden,
    te "herkennen" indien die informatie
    "ongewenst" is.

"Herkennen" in de zin van dat die informatie (c.q één of meer delen daarvan), voldoet aan _éérder_ door autoriteiten vastgestelde criteria.

Daarbij moet Chatcontrol meerdere, verschillende, "brokken" informatie kunnen "herkennen". Welke "brokken" dat zijn staat niet bij voorbaat vast en kan op elk moment worden uitgebreid.

U kunt Chatcontrol prima vergelijken met de (basis) scanfunctionaliteit van een virusscanner op uw PC. Als een bestand gescand wordt, haalt de virusscanner, één voor één, records met criteria voor specifieke computervirussen uit de database met "virusdefinities" (virusscanners downloaden soms meerdere keren per dag de laatste versie van hun database). Als het gescande bestand *reeds bekende* schadelijke software bevat, laat de virusscanner *u* een waarschuwing zien.

Net als bij de scanfunctie van een virusscanner, zou Chatcontrol beeldmateriaal moeten herkennen waarvan éérder is vastgesteld dat daarop "seksueel kindermisbruik" te zien is.

Merk op m.b.t. dat beeldmateriaal: "EERDER VASTGESTELD". Met de huidige technologie is het namelijk onmogelijk om (zonder absurd veel valspositieven, dus onterechte "herkenning") *live* seksueel kindermisbruik te herkennen.

Chatcontrol gaat dus sowieso geen daders opsporen die via livestreams Filippijnse kinderen laten misbruiken (nos.nl/artikel/2533794-rechtsz), maar ook geen "klassieke" makers van kinderporno. Immers, Chatcontrol herkent (als het goed gaat) uitsluitend *eerder* als zijnde kinderporno herkend beeldmateriaal.

Anders dan bij uw virusscanner zal Chatcontrol niet *u*, maar iemand in een "EU-centrum" (naar verluidt [1] gepland in Den Haag, nabij het Europol-gebouw) waarschuwen indien u, via een chat-app, informatie verstuurt die (al dan niet terecht [2]) door Chatcontrol wordt "herkend".

Hoewel voormalig minister Yesilgöz stelde dat Chatcontrol geen encryptie doorbreekt en dat kinderrechten belangrijker zijn dan uw privacy (dat *zijn* sterke argumenten), hoor ik bijna niemand beargumenteren waarom Chatcontrol juist (seksueel) kindermisbruik zal laten toenemen, zoals ik in o.a. [3] beargumenteerde.

Ook experts zoals Iva Bicanic, Robbert Hoving en Arda Gerkens waarschuwen voor risico's van Chatcontrol (voor links zie [4]).

Minder ruchtbaarheid is eraan gegeven dat Chatcontrol, naar verluidt [5], ook voor het opsporen van andere "criminaliteit" bedoeld is.

Lasy but not least, FTM.eu onthulde in [6] dat Ashton Kutcher en anderen een ordinaire lobby met winstoogmerk voor Chatcontrol voerden bij de EC.

[0] mastodon.nl/@bert_hubert/11320

[1] eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-conten
Daaruit:
«
(72) Aangezien het EU-centrum intensief met Europol moet samenwerken, moet de zetel van het EU-centrum worden gevestigd naast die van Europol, namelijk in Den Haag (Nederland).
»

[2] security.nl/posting/797615 (lang, veel details)

[3] infosec.exchange/@ErikvanStrat

[4] security.nl/posting/858879

[5] tweedekamer.nl/downloads/docum
Daarin schreef toenmalig minister van Justitie, Dilan Yesilgöz (nadruk aangebracht door mij):
"[...]
Encryptie stelt de opsporing voor grote uitdagingen. In opsporingsonderzoeken blijkt het in veel gevallen zeer lastig en soms onmogelijk om gegevens die nodig zijn om criminelen op te sporen te verkrijgen. Ook in gevallen waarin dat volgens de wet is aangewezen. Deze uitdagingen zijn vooral aan de orde bij diensten die gebruik maken van end-to-end encryptie.
[...]
Dit gebrek belemmert de opsporings- en inlichtingendiensten in hun wettelijke taak de samenleving veilig te maken. Ik deel deze zorgen en vind ik het van belang dat de mogelijkheden van de opsporing om criminaliteit tegen te gaan effectief en adequaat zijn. Om zo te voorkomen dat criminelen vrij spel hebben, *ONDER ANDERE* bij het verspreiden van online materiaal van seksueel kindermisbruik.
[...]"

[6] ftm.eu/articles/ashton-kutcher (alt: archive.is/mtitb).

nos.nlRechtszaken over misbruik op livestreams: 'Nieuwe vorm van kindersekstoerisme'Sinds de coronajaren is er meer online misbruik van Filipijnse kinderen. Deze week dienen in Nederland twee rechtszaken.
Replied in thread

@aral : regardless of which chat app you use (if even any): if you want to help protect children from being (sexually) abused, wake up everyone who thinks that Chatcontrol will solve that problem.

On the contrary, it will make things worse: not a single abused child will be found while the number of (police) officers, who chase actual abusers of children, will decrease. More info via infosec.exchange/@ErikvanStrat.

There are a zillion of other reasons why Chatcontrol won't save children but will cause havoc: it is *hard* to *re-detect* known CSAM video's (safer.io/resources/video-hashi) while it is impossible to reliably detect abuse of children in live streams.

@signalapp

Infosec ExchangeErik van Straten (@ErikvanStraten@infosec.exchange)@prolrage@todon.nl : IMO the biggest problem resulting from "chatcontrol" is *not* the privacy-impact. Which, by the way, has been repeatedly swept aside (for example by Dilan Yesilgöz, the former Dutch justice minister) while arguing that the safety of children is more important. See for example (in Dutch) https://security.nl/posting/797615. It is that it will not increase the safety of a single child. Worse, it will lead to more children suffering from (sexual) abuse. Details in https://infosec.exchange/@ErikvanStraten/113075518670257012 and a lot more (in Dutch) in https://security.nl/posting/797711/CSS+erger+dan+E2EE-verbod%3F and (with some English text) https://www.security.nl/posting/797336/Het+risico+van+E2EE. #ChatControl #CSS #ClientSideScanning
#CSS#ChatControl#CSAM
Continued thread

Die Geschichte der #Chatkontrolle ist auch fest an die angeblich wohltätige Kinderschutzorganisation #Thorn von #AshtonKutcher gebunden. Dieser traf sich mindestens ein Dutzend Mal mit #YlvaJohansson & Co.

Neben dem Kinderschutz geht es da aber auch um knallharte Finanzinteressen: Diese Startup-ähnliche Organisation verkauft nämlich Software, mit der genau das gemacht werden kann, was die Chatkontrolle fordert. So ein Gesetz wäre eine Goldgrube: #RegulatoryCapture.

6/n
netzpolitik.org/2023/chatkontr

netzpolitik.org · Chatkontrolle-Lobbyist Thorn: Mehr Startup als WohltätigkeitsorganisationDie von Ashton Kutcher gegründete Organisation Thorn hat einen guten Zugang zur EU-Kommission und lobbyiert dort vehement für die Einführung der Chatkontrolle. Doch ist Thorn überhaupt die