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#postquantum

1 post1 participant0 posts today
Thorsten Leemhuis (acct. 1/4)

Linus on "[#Linux #kernel] Module signing and post-quantum crypto public key algorithms":

'"I'd suggest you worry more about the rumors that Kazakhstan is growing a veritable army of gerbils, and giving them all ABACUSES!

What's your plan for that imminent attack vector? Because they could be here any day.

Yes, yes, please stop using RSA and relying over-much on big prime numbers. But let's not throw the "Post Quantum" word around as if it was reality.

The reality of kernel security remains actual bugs - both in hardware and in software - not some buzzword."'

lore.kernel.org/all/CAHk-%3Dwg

lore.kernel.orgMaking sure you're not a bot!
#LinuxKernel#PostQuantum
C.

Daniel J. Bernstein (#djb, to those who know and love him [1]) has a new blog entry about the NIST post-quantum #cryptography standardization process that's been ongoing for some years. Also, follow him @djb .

If you're not aware of some of the controversy about how NIST is running this process, it's a must-read.

blog.cr.yp.to/20250423-mceliec

My $0.02: it sure looks like NIST is backstopping an attempt by the NSA to get everyone to standardize on cryptography #standards that the #NSA knows how to break.

Again.

Yes, they did it before. If you read up on the Dual_EC calamity and its fallout, and how this time it was supposed to be different - open, transparent, secure - then prepare to be disappointed. NIST is playing #Calvinball with their rules for this contest, yanking the rug out from under contenders that appear to be more #secure and better understood, while pushing alternatives that are objectively worse (#weaker encryption, less studied, poorer #performance).

Frankly, I think organizations outside of the #USA would be foolish to trust anything that comes out of #NIST's current work. Well, those inside the USA too, but some of those may be forced by law to use whatever NIST certifies.

[1] Some people think djb is "prickly", not lovable. Oddly, it seems that the only people who say this are those who are wildly incorrect about code/algorithms and are being gently but publicly corrected about by djb at the time

blog.cr.yp.tocr.yp.to: 2025.04.23: McEliece standardization
#quantum#PostQuantum#PostQuantumCryptography
Continued thread
Blue Ghost

07.03.2025: GnuPG announces release of 2.5.5 for public testing, finalized PQC algorithms are supported.
Source: lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnup

11.03.2025: NIST selects HQC as fifth algorithm for post-quantum encryption.
Source: nist.gov/news-events/news/2025

PQC: wikipedia.org/wiki/Post-quantu
GnuPG: mastodon.online/@blueghost/111
Harvest now, decrypt later: mastodon.online/@blueghost/111

#PQC#PostQuantum#Cryptography
Scott Francis

IETF has a draft up for #PQC functionality baked into OpenPGP datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft #postquantum

IETF DatatrackerPost-Quantum Cryptography in OpenPGPThis document defines a post-quantum public-key algorithm extension for the OpenPGP protocol. Given the generally assumed threat of a cryptographically relevant quantum computer, this extension provides a basis for long-term secure OpenPGP signatures and ciphertexts. Specifically, it defines composite public-key encryption based on ML- KEM (formerly CRYSTALS-Kyber), composite public-key signatures based on ML-DSA (formerly CRYSTALS-Dilithium), both in combination with elliptic curve cryptography, and SLH-DSA (formerly SPHINCS+) as a standalone public key signature scheme.
Alexandre Dulaunoy

Post-Quantum Cryptography in OpenPGP - an IETF draft

#openpgp #pgp #postquantum

🔗 datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft

IETF DatatrackerPost-Quantum Cryptography in OpenPGPThis document defines a post-quantum public-key algorithm extension for the OpenPGP protocol. Given the generally assumed threat of a cryptographically relevant quantum computer, this extension provides a basis for long-term secure OpenPGP signatures and ciphertexts. Specifically, it defines composite public-key encryption based on ML- KEM (formerly CRYSTALS-Kyber), composite public-key signatures based on ML-DSA (formerly CRYSTALS-Dilithium), both in combination with elliptic curve cryptography, and SLH-DSA (formerly SPHINCS+) as a standalone public key signature scheme.
*
Blue Ghost

Post-quantum cryptography posts.

13.08.2024: NIST releases first three finalized PQC encryption standards.
Source: nist.gov/news-events/news/2024

12.09.2024: GnuPG announces release of 2.5.1 for public testing, finalized PQC algorithms are supported.
Source: lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnup

PQC: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Post-qua
GnuPG: mastodon.online/@blueghost/111
Harvest now, decrypt later: mastodon.online/@blueghost/111

#PQC#PostQuantum#Cryptography
Colan Schwartz

Go ahead and start implementing these, folks. Maybe get some help from a friendly neighborhood cryptographer, though, so you don't set them up incorrectly; we've seen this a lot with the current batch of algorithms.

theregister.com/2024/08/14/nis

The Register · NIST finalizes trio of post-quantum encryption standardsBy Jessica Lyons
#cryptography#postquantum#postquantumcryptography
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